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But then they took him to the jailhouse 
Where they try to turn a man into a mouse. 
 – Bob Dylan, Hurricane 
1. Introduction 
 Constitutional protections from the State’s punitive power are necessary.1 Defending 
them is often unpopular. It is also controversial: as occurs on other topics, their substance is not 
always defined in every detail by the Constitution and therefore democratic organs can vindicate 
an exclusive role in their interpretation. The Argentine Supreme Court has interpreted them 
relatively generously in recent years. The main question is whether this should be cause for 
celebration, or if on the contrary it is a good result reached in the worst fashion. 
 In this essay I will analyze the issue: what justification must an academic adopt who is 
simultaneously concerned with reinforcing the democratic project of the country and with 
protecting the rights of weakest sectors (as are a good part of those subject to the state punitive 
apparatus). For those of us who sustain on a normative level – and with a degree of abstract 
refinement – that the political branches can be respectful of rights, some resentment might be felt 
at the prospect of losing monopolistic control over important decisions of penal planning. 
Leaving this task in the hands of a small group, whether it be a few judges or technicians, might 
                                                            
 I am most grateful to Marcelo Alegre, Fernando Basch, Marcelo Ferrante, Roberto Gargarella, Margarita Maxit, 
Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe, and María Paula Saffón, for their helpful and generous comments on an earlier draft of this 
essay.  
1 In this easy I do not provide a conceptualization of these protections, although I offer some examples of them. 
When I refer to these constitutional protections I have in mind things like the limits of police forces to investigate 
crimes; standards about arrest and pre-trial detention, as well as the validity of evidence collected; the right to be 
assisted by state-appointed counsel, to appeal a conviction, and to be tried within a reasonable period of time; 




emanate an elitist flavor. At the same time, however, if we value decisions such as the ones 
mentioned that protect rights, then we might find quite problematic the fact that the choices of 
the majority of the political body are or might be different from those decisions. 
 The debate is related to normative and empirical questions but also incorporates a 
methodological turn. What are the dangers and what are the advantages of confiding in 
democracy when decisions regarding guarantees in criminal cases must be taken? More to the 
point, how do we begin to answer this question without the aid of a metric for gauging the 
dangers, or for measuring the practical operability of the concept of ‘democracy’? This piece, 
then, turns around possible relationships and tensions between “guaranteeism” [garantismo], 
penal populism, and democracy. Without doubt, it is another manifestation of the long-standing 
debate between constitutionalism and judicial review. But it is a manifestation of it in an 
especially sensitive area that presents pointed implications and challenges for those of us who 
strive to defend the rights of the weakest sectors in societies that, albeit democratic, are still 
dealing with major deficiencies. 
 The way I have laid out the question might invite an automatic reaction: How can anyone 
nowadays question the important role of judges in protecting penal guarantees? After all, a good 
amount of modern thought on penal law (from classics such as Beccaria2 to contemporaries such 
as L. Ferrajoli3) emphasizes the necessity of protecting a nucleus of individual values against 
efforts to implement tougher punishments, and these efforts have been primarily headed by 
political powers. This response, however, does not turn out to be obvious to many people, 
including people who are genuinely concerned with promoting (some version of) equality. Here 
                                                            
2 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT. 
3 See DERECHO Y RAZÓN, TEORÍA DEL GARANTISMO PENAL. See also GARANTISMO, UNA DISCUSIÓN SOBRE DERECHOS 




is what interests me: pondering whether, at least in countries with the characteristics and 
ailments such as those in our region, we can have it all: democracy + guarantees. And whether, 
when judges advance, the appropriate reaction should be a mere sentiment of nostalgia or one, by 
contrast, of affirmation. 
 Criticism of a position like the one I defend can take at least two similar but non-identical 
perspectives. I will call them the perspectives of ‘democratic wager’ and of ‘genuine 
democracy.’ The first is inspired by possible readings of theories critical of judicial review such 
as that proposed by Jeremy Waldron.4  Whether this reading of Waldron’s work is correct is less 
important than its substance; there are many other authors that defend similar arguments. As we 
know, Waldron emphasizes the fact that contemporary political communities suffer from radical 
disagreement over normative questions.5 Yet there are two possible interpretations of the 
implications of this statement. According to one (the canonical one; the one he himself seems to 
defend at the outset), the fact of reasonable pluralism should keep judges out of this space. It is 
not up to them. Disagreements must be settled through votes by the community itself; that is how 
differences are respected. When they intervene, judges typically reproduce the disagreement 
behind closed doors in the courts. In order to concentrate on the discussion that interests me, I 
am going to set aside this interpretation. Although accepting the thesis of normative skepticism is 
not conceptually obligatory for it, this interpretation adopts a hostile bias against the idea that 
there exists a nucleus of values that we do not want to renounce, an idea like the one I defend in 
this essay and one I return to near the end. However much we may disagree as to the exact 
substance of these nucleic values, we accept that many possible interpretations fall outside the 
bounds of admissibility. 
                                                            





 The second reading of Waldron’s theory differs from the first in a relevant aspect.6 The 
issue is no longer that resolving disagreement is impossible and as such must be settled through 
voting. Disagreement continues to exist. This reading, however, insists that the political system 
is capable of respecting a commitment to rights (incorporated from outside the legislative 
system) as competently or even more competently than judges, and of providing good answers 
regarding the exact content of those rights. This results from a combination of tools that limit the 
power of majorities and further strengthen deliberation. It also results from the very legislative 
function: the type of arguments that legislators often adopt (arguments that are less technical than 
those of judges, which makes it easier to directly attack the substantive issue at stake), and the 
special position that they occupy facing the electorate. When political bodies are bypassed, the 
voice of those who have the greatest democratic credentials is ignored, and with it the voice of 
those who have good chances of reaching acceptable solutions. 
 This reading (of the ‘democratic wager’) represents the first perspective hostile to the 
idea of a special role for judges in penal matters. The second perspective is represented in the 
region by the work of Roberto Gargarella. In many of his writings, Gargarella denounces the 
democratic shortfalls of criminal law.7 He does it with an underlying concern that I share for the 
need to find alternative solutions to punishment. Yet I will suggest that such a position could 
force acceptance of a conclusion that is different from that of the author. According to 
Gargarella, criminal law grew out of the pendulum movement between penal populism and an 
elitism that is respectful of guarantees. In fact, the author denies that there is a sharp distinction 
between these two phenomena. In both cases, the problem is that a political elite adopts decisions 
                                                            
6 This seems to be the position Waldron defends in The Core of the Case against Judicial Review. 
7 See ROBERTO GARGARELLA, DE LA INJUSTICIA PENAL A LA JUSTICIA SOCIAL (Siglo del Hombre Editores, 




with its back to democracy. When the elite is committed to protecting individual guarantees, the 
formulation of criminal law is allocated to “governmental experts and professional litigants – the 
product of ‘expert knowledge and empirical research.’” But elitism is not even abandoned when 
the pendulum swings to the opposite extreme. In this sense, populism is the product of a select, 
politically conservative minority that “acts or claims to act in the name of the majority,” a 
supposed majority that is in turn fueled by the communication media.8 Gargarella suggests 
avoiding the trap of elitism by embracing a deliberative conception of democracy (comprising 
what I identify here as the search for ‘genuine democracy’): 
[Populist norms are] created in the absence of … a collective, equitable 
discussion; they arise in a context characterized by social fragmentation and 
economic inequality, which normally implies a process of public communication 
that turns out to depend on money. [E]ven if opinion polls truly indicated a 
convergence between ‘tough’ criminal policies and the will of the majority, we 
would still face a long path before being able to say that … those norms were the 
expression of the democratic will. In any case, they can only be considered that 
expression if an extraordinary weak sense of the democratic will is adopted, such 
that it is reduced to what … certain opinion polls say that the citizenry believe. 
We must … refuse the invitation to honor any norm whatsoever by qualifying it 
as democratic; in the end, refusing the invitation to reduce democracy to the 
happenstance of some opinion poll or other more or less random sampling of 
opinions.9 
In a text whose target is precisely L. Ferrajoli, Gargarella goes through arguments similar to 
those mentioned, particularly criticizing judges in contrast to the defense of them that the Italian 
makes. For Gargarella, elitism and its biases apply to them: 
In the first place, we can say that the passions, interests, the flights of irrationality, 
are not the exclusive heritance of any group. It so happens that there are no 
reasons to believe that our legal system is invulnerable to bias based on class, 
gender, religion, or race that we would like to see kept outside consideration when 
resolving conflicts between rights … The make-up of the legal establishment in 
our countries has clearly shown itself to be biased in such terms, at least 
                                                            
8 Id., at 56-57. 




according to the few sociological studies available (most judges are white, 
middle-class, Catholic, conservative, etc.), and in turn there appears to be a high 
correlation between the prevalence of a certain profile and the outcomes of 
judicial decisions. Empirical evidence on this last aspect, at least, is not 
insignificant…. Things become even more complicated when we recognize that 
… judges must necessarily become involved in the interpretation of the rights at 
stake in order to define their contours, reach, and substance. And there, 
predictably, is where biases such as those indicated begin to operate, normally 
unduly so.10 
In this essay, I will suggest that both the ‘democratic wager’ position and the ‘genuine 
democracy’ alternative are flawed. The first, because of the high costs that accepting it in the 
name of democracy might impose. The second, because the concept of democracy it implies is 
too distant from a position where an examination of reality on a local level is possible, so it loses 
operational capacity. My response is that, in the end, penal guarantees – constitutionally 
determined – must be given firm protection by judges. And when this happens we should 
celebrate instead of – merely – bowing to it. This does not imply that we do not have to make a 
commitment to improving democracy. The questions are not mutually exclusive, and my 
conclusion regarding the role of judges will change once the political organs demonstrate 
sustained support for guarantees. 
 In offering this response, I will try to avoid the rhetorical maneuver of evoking the 
brutally bleak scenarios that could result if the protection of these guarantees is left in the hands 
of political organs. For this reason, I will bring up a case that is both real and non-extraordinary 
(that started with a public demonstration in Argentina demanding more intensity in the state 
punitive reaction) to illuminate some of the risks of such a strategy while stopping short of 
portraying it in the worst light possible. As I will argue later, it is not necessary to eulogize 
judges in order to defend them (I largely share Gargarella’s wariness). They are not heroes and it 
                                                            





is perhaps not a coincidence that the Spanish verb fallar means both to hand down a sentence 
and to be defective. 
 In spite of my constant reference to them, I am not going to elaborate a detailed defense 
of criminal guarantees or protections in this essay.11 They do not occupy all of the terrain in 
criminal law. There are many criminal policy decisions that can remain in the domain of the 
representative organs (what actions to penalize, what general structure to give the criminal 
justice system, etc.) insofar as they do not involve direct ties to these protections. In any case, I 
am assuming that there is consensus regarding the protections among the participants of SELA, 
even if there are differences of opinion regarding their precise content (“Can a homeowner’s 
consent excuse police who enter without a warrant?”; “Is the principle that holds that evidence 
illegally obtained cannot be used against the accused absolute or are there exceptions?”; etc.). 
Naturally, however, I also assume that, as a general pattern, we believe that the bodies with the 
best democratic credentials need to be the ones that define public policy in a community. 
Readers of this piece will find little sense in it if they feel these general presumptions are 
mistaken (as far as they are concerned). But in this essay I am not concerned with trying to 
convince people who disagree with these premises. 
 In the next section (2), I lay out the case in Argentina just referred to. First I describe the 
popular demonstration and its fate in congress, and then I offer a comment on the reaction of the 
courts. I close the section with an allusion to the process of constitutional reform in Argentina. I 
will dissect the discussion already mentioned using this case as a reference in section 3. I analyze 
the practical implications of the affirmation that democracy can be respectful of criminal 
                                                            




protections, and highlight in fairness the potential costs of the strategy. Section 4 comprises a 
very brief conclusion. 
2. One phenomenon, many faces 
a)  On Thursday afternoon, April 1, 2004, around one hundred fifty thousand people 
gathered in front of the Argentine Congress to demand better security. They were reacting 
against a wave of kidnappings and what they perceived to be a rise in the number of crimes 
committed against property and personal safety. They were answering a call formulated by a 
spontaneous and improbable leader, who had risen up to become the informal representative of 
the victims of crime: Juan Carlos Blumberg, the grieving father of a young man assassinated in 
the course of a kidnapping. At the end of the march, Blumberg presented Congress with a 
petition demanding, among other measures, harsher sentences for delinquents and limited 
possibilities for release.12 
 This march would be followed by four more between 2004 and 2006 in what was a 
forceful demonstration of an incipient social movement that was not completely organized and 
whose primary reclamation was for toughening punitive reactions of the State. The daily 
diatribes of Blumberg against judges contained colorful phrases: “We don’t want to see early 
release for good behavior or anything else. Our judges are more on the side of the criminals and 
assassins than they are on our side, the community’s side.”13 Or more synthetically: “It would 
appear that human rights are for delinquents, not for citizens like you.” 14 The media echoed the 
                                                            
12 Masiva marcha frente al Congreso para pedir seguridad, Diario Clarín, digital edition, April 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/04/01/um/m-734923.htm. Multitudinaria marcha contra la inseguridad, Diario 
La Nación, April 1, 2004, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=588493. 
13 Id. 
14 Jorgelina Vidal and Pablo Abiad, Otra vez fue masiva la marcha de Blumberg reclamando seguridad, Diario 




message, amplifying it generously and converting it into a recurring theme lasting months that 
was as voluminous as it was monotonous. 
 Six years later (I write this on April 1, 2010), little remains of this social phenomenon as 
such. Its decline was spurred in part by Blumberg himself, a figure who gradually lost the 
interest of many of his supporters after committing obfuscations15 and making controversial 
statements (expressing understanding after ‘gun-happy’ policemen killed a young man; 16 
defending weighted voting systems17 and the death penalty;18 and displaying racist tendencies19). 
 This is not to say he did not achieve his immediate goals. For although this movement 
which initially lacked a defined structure has dissipated (at least for now), it left behind 
something quite important: a set of laws approved in the heat of the supposed popular demand, 
all of which are in force today.20 These laws – known as the “Blumberg laws” – set out measures 
for “increased sentences for illegally carrying or possessing weapons, which will no longer be 
eligible for early release, [registering] cellular telephones, increased sentences for crimes such as 
                                                            
15 Blumberg liked to be referred to as ‘Mr. Engineer’, despite the fact that he did not have the corresponding 
professional accreditation. He tried to justified it: “People used to call me ‘Engineer’, ‘Engineer’, and so I got used 
to it.” Siempre me decían ingeniero, ingeniero, y uno se acostumbró, Diario Clarín, June 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2007/06/17/elpais/p-00301.htm.  
16 Blumberg defended the Mendoza police department, which was responsible for killing a young man in 1997. He 
said that “[t]he young  man used drug and had misbehaved when he insulted a police officer.” Rafael Morán, 
“Polémica declaración de Blumberg sobre el crimen de Sebastián Bordón”, Diario Clarín, May 19, 2004, available 
at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/05/19/policiales/g-03801.htm.  
17 In an interview with Diario Clarin, Blumberg stated that “he always said to Axel [his murdered son] that in this 
country there should be a weighted voting system. People should be allowed to vote depending on their level of 
education. The vote of an educated person should count for two or three votes.” Diario Clarín, “La gente ve que la 
política no funciona”, August 26, 2004, available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/08/26/elpais/p-01101.htm.  
18 During an interview broadcast on television, he argued that death penalty should be the adequate punishment for 
kidnapping and murder: “Anyone who kills a person should be killed. I will have none of that human rights talk.” 
Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJl7KI4IRbw.  
19 When asked during an interview about his alleged racist stances, Blumberg denied it. He tried to defend himself 
by saying: “No, no, of course I am not a racist. I do not discriminate. I will even tell you more: I have friends in 
Brazil, who surely have black skin, but have a white soul; see?” Id.  
20 Statute 25.882 (harsher punishment for violent robbery), published on April 26, 2004. Statute 25.886 (crimes 
using weapons), published on May 5, 2004. Statute 25.892 (restriction of release on bail), published on May 26, 
2004. Statute 25.893 (harsher punishment for crimes against sexual integrity), published on May 26, 2004. Statute 




homicide, kidnapping, and rape, … restrictions on early release and raising the maximum limit 
for consecutive sentences for different offenses … to 50 years.”21 
 The response of Congress to the first demonstration was automatic: the very day of the 
march, the House of Representatives called a special session to consider a series of measures to 
increase sentences. In Congress, Blumberg found legislators who were receptive to his 
arguments, even among those of whom one would have expected greater resistance (such as 
several of the representatives of an administration that made efforts to associate itself with 
progressive positions).22 One of the reasons that might explain the headway made in the 
relatively inert Congress (besides the unreserved support of some of the legislators) was the fear 
of its members in the face of a phenomenon that was growing in popularity. Not long before, in 
the end of 2001, a severe economic crisis had struck the country. The crisis had political 
repercussions: the gulf separating the represented from the representatives had been exposed, and 
popular indignation had been unleashed in a series of demonstrations which in some instances 
demanded the resignation of every last government official. 
 Facing this situation, no legislator wanted to be left out, even those whose political 
platforms did not include any such position towards crime. This could explain the dismal quality 
of the legislative debate. The words of the deputy Rosario Romero, from the party in power, are 
eloquent: “Blumberg was in our office every day telling Maria del Carmen (Falbo) and me that 
                                                            
21 Adriana Meyer, “Para pasar más leyes de mano dura el ingeniero tiene menos espacios”, Página 12, September 3, 
2006, available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-72449-2006-09-03.html.  
22 Statute 25.892 (restriction of release on bail) was approved in the Senate with 58 senators voting in favor 
(including the current President); 1 senator voted no. In the House [Diputados], 162 deputies voted for it, while 38 
voted no, and 3 abstained. Statute 25.886 (crimes using weapons) was approved in the Senate by 48 votes; 4 
senators said no. In the House, 205 deputies voted for it, 3 voted no, and 2 abstained. Statute 25.928 (harsher 
punishment for the commission of independent crimes) was approved in the Senate, with 53 members voting for it; 5 
said no, and 1 abstained. In the House, 95 deputies voted for it, 18 against it, and 46 abstained. The ruling Peronist 




we were advocating for criminals, so you can see it was very difficult …”23 In the Senate, Diana 
Conti, also from the ruling party, tried to denounce the support for the laws: “As I will not be 
used and am ideologically opposed to the fascist posture that this Congress has adopted, I will 
not support any measure produced by the insanity that has taken hold of this country’s House of 
Representatives. And I strongly hope that if the President … takes everything that is happening 
into account, he will, despite the political costs, pay the necessary attention to rational arguments 
and immediately form a commission to reformulate the Criminal Code to incorporate the proper 
rationality and sentences.”24 
 The ruling party’s leader in the Senate, M. A. Pichetto, responded: “I would like to speak 
in a language that is … clearer. I don’t know … if society is listening, but if someone is and they 
do not know the Criminal Code, the idea is that they might understand … [that] we are trying to 
avoid impunity in Argentina, … [so that] in the face of grave crimes committed by dangerous 
criminals … the offenders are not allowed to walk free soon afterwards … What I mean is that 
the Senate does not have fascist intentions.” 25 If a harder hand was what they wanted, a harder 
hand they would get. The laws had already passed six months after the first demonstration. 
b)  That was one of the phenomenon’s faces, but there is another: the actions of one sector of 
the judicial branch before, during, and after the series of dramatic events. The judicial branch is 
made up of a set of complex and varied organs. I am principally concerned with its head, the 
Supreme Court, and only bring up the occasional fact with regards the lower judges. From a 
descriptive perspective, one might expect that the – at least supposed – popular demand for a 
                                                            
23 According to media reports, Romero voted no, but her party [the ruling Peronists] supported all the laws. See 
Adriana Meyer, supra note 21. See also note 22.   





harder line on crime would make an impression and have an impact on judges’ decisions. Judges 
form part of the community, and are open to greater or lesser degree to the influence of the 
greater community’s values or reactions (whether or not they are initially convinced by them). 
 Going against the popular fervor and its rapid legislative reception, several lower judges 
held that the norms were unconstitutional, although it should be noted that these decisions were 
not immediate.26 And the Supreme Court? The best (and only) manner to analyze its work is to 
take the cases in which constitutional protections were at stake in the face of state punitive power 
(the court did not directly take up the ‘Blumberg laws’27). The Court’s composition, remember, 
had changed in 2003 with the arrival of Nestor Kirchner in power. In part to reinforce the social 
backing of a government that had won the election with a mere 22% of the votes, Kirchner gave 
orders to stage political trials of several of the judges from the so-called ‘automatic majority’ of 
the ex-President Carlos Menem. After one and a half years, these judges, who had backed several 
grossly illegal measures during Menem’s administration, had been removed from their posts or 
had resigned in the face of imminent removal. At the same time, Kirchner implemented an 
unheard of mechanism, both transparent and participatory, to improve the selection process for 
Supreme Court judges. This led to the designation between 2003 and 2004 of four new judges 
(of whom two women were named for the first time in the democratic history of the country) 
through a process that everyone saw as a qualitative leap forward with respect to prior 
experiences. To the government’s displeasure, which was in some cases expressed very openly, 
the judges began very soon to display a certain degree of independence. 
                                                            
26 Both an appeals court in Buenos Aires [the Cámara del Crimen de Buenos Aires] in 2006 and a trial court [the 
Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal nº 1] in 2009 struck down statute 25.886, the most controversial of the statutes. See 
“Rechazo de la Justicia a una ‘ley Blumberg’”, Diario La Nación, August 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1159093. See also Adriana Meyer, supra note 21. 
27 The Court decided not to review a case where one of the statutes had been challenged. Supreme Court of 
Argentina, “Lemes” decision, September 9, 2009. As explained in the text, the Court has discretion to get rid of 




 The period between 1994 and 2007 pre- and post-dates not only the ‘new’ Court but also 
the beginning of the ‘Blumberg phenomenon’ (we shall see that 1994 was an important year, as 
it was then that the constitutional reforms were implemented). When someone accused or 
convicted of a crime during this period claimed a constitutional guarantee of theirs had been 
violated, in 72% of the cases the Court sided with them.28 After the change in the Court, and rise 
of Blumberg, this tendency became more marked: the proportion rose to 82%, never falling 
below 75% in any year.29  The numbers themselves are not categorical; we do not know, for 
example, which claims deserved greater protection and what the Court’s response in these cases 
was. The high baseline of the proportions also hides methodological issues: the proportions are 
calculated solely on the basis of cases selected by the Court (which has the discretionary capacity 
to refuse cases) and many of the cases are similar if not identical. They are very significant just 
the same. It would be peculiar, for example, if all of the claims involving these themes, despite 
having strong constitutional protection, were refused. 
 This quantitative aspect has a qualitative correlation: during this period, the Court 
changed a good number of criteria with the very aim of increasing protections in the face of state 
punitive power. Among them were: criteria related to conditions for detention and the state of 
prisons (especially in response to a class action – the Verbitsky case – that involved thousands of 
untried prisoners in the Province of Buenos Aires); the right to free and competent counsel; the 
right to contest evidence brought by the prosecutor; the right to impartiality, preventing a judge 
who investigates a case from passing sentence; the right to a trial that is carried out in timely 
                                                            
28 The data comes from my own research, based on 241 observations. The dataset includes all decisions dealing with 
criminal protections published by the Court, as well as by commercial databases La Ley and Abeledo Perrot 
(formerly known as Jurisprudencia Argentina). It excludes all cases rejected by the Court on discretion, and those 
rejected due to technical deficiencies of the appeals.  




fashion, the failure of which requiring charges to be dropped; the illegality of indefinite prison 
sentences; the right of the accused not to incriminate themselves; the invalidity of convictions 
reached in the absence of formal charges by the state prosecutor; and the invalidity of evidence 
illegally obtained.30  
 Some of the standards (which, as in the ‘Blumberg laws,’ are as procedural as they are 
substantive) could be better defined or even more robust. The Court, for example, faltered in a 
case regarding the imprisonment of minors.31 And one should not believe that the Court 
demonstrated heroic character in all of the other cases either. The image is not one of Herculean 
judges resisting the clamor of a mobilized citizenry. The overwhelming majority of the 
population probably did not realize that the Court was handing down these incremental, 
apparently ‘technical’ decisions, given the extremely lower amount of repercussion in the media 
there was compared to the phenomenon described in the previous section. Even so, the trend is 
indisputable. It is explained, in part, by the new composition of the Court (one of the new 
members, Judge Zaffaroni, is an influential criminal law scholar who has supported a minimalist 
approach to criminal law). Keeping this last factor in mind, the temptation is to assume that the 
Court’s decisions enjoyed the blessing of the government who had appointed the new judges. 
Following this assumption, this judiciary response had double meaning: it personified both the 
voice of the Court and that of the government in terms of its philosophical, legal, and political 
approach to the crime problem. 
                                                            
30 See ASOCIACIÓN POR LOS DERECHOS CIVILES, LA CORTE Y LOS DERECHOS 2005-2007 (Siglo XXI editores, 2009), 
for a comprehensive discussion of these developments.  
31 See Juan F. González Bertomeu, El diálogo de la liberación. La Corte y el caso ‘García Méndez’, in LEONARDO 
PITLEVNIK (ED.), JURISPRUDENCIA PENAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN, VOLUMEN 7 




 If this relationship between the Court and government did in fact exist, it was altogether 
weak. The government’s position was, if nothing else, unclear; it could come out as much in 
favor as against the trend described. A large majority of legislators from the ruling party had 
supported the ‘Blumberg laws.’ Some of the indicators of Nestor Kirchner’s attitude on crime are 
not promising: “The courts do not only err when they set poor criminals free, but also when 
delinquents from good families are released despite having been tried and found guilty.” This 
declaration does not necessarily imply that he, his government, or that of his successor (the ex-
Senator Cristina Fernández) are against constitutional protections. Perhaps the declaration could 
even be neutralized by others that communicate an opposing sense. The most accurate 
explanation is probably that these grandiloquent phrases are produced opportunistically in the 
heat of political battle according to the intensity of public perception of insecurity (Kirchner 
might even have been similarly motivated when deciding to meet with Blumberg several times). 
But the commitment, if it exists, is unclear. 
 The ‘Blumberg phenomenon’ occurred during an administration that – if nothing else – 
was not opposed to maintaining the protections such as those mention in force. Other 
governments in recent history would have probably displayed an equal or greater commitment to 
them. And others would have displayed palpably less. At the start of the decade, for example, the 
then-governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Carlos Ruckauf, promised leniency for future 
police brutality when he said: “Criminals need to be shot.”32 A proposal from the current 
governor, Daniel Scioli, perhaps the national government’s principal ally, is not very different. 
According to Scioli, “in times like these, with so many demands by the public for more order and 
stricter, harsher, tougher policies, we have to do everything in our reach within the limits of the 
                                                            
32 Ruckauf: ‘Le dije a Scioli que se debe encarar una solución a la italiana contra el delito’, Diario La Nación, 




rule of law…” And he added: “If the police have to take down criminals during a confrontation, 
they will do it. Me, I back up my police.”33 
 Expressions such as the ones noted are voiced in contexts of prison overpopulation, 
especially in Buenos Aires, the largest province of the country, where an overwhelming majority 
of prisoners are waiting for their sentence in overcrowded conditions (this context, in fact, would 
eventually stir the Court to intervene in the case on prison conditions already mentioned). The 
expressions also occur in a context of a notoriously dysfunctional police force that has dozens of 
cases of violence and abuse on its record. 
c)  The Argentine Constitution includes both protections against punitive power and positive 
obligations regarding the purpose of criminal sentences and prison conditions. The text adopted 
in 1853 already had them, but they were significantly reinforced as part of the constitutional 
reforms of 1994. The reforms incorporated into the Constitution’s hierarchy a series of 
international agreements (the American Convention on Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights being two examples) that protect such values with vigor 
and specificity.34   
 The change was very meaningful. For example, when handing down decisions on issues 
such as the ones already mentioned, the Court often invokes the constitutional protections that 
follow from it. What led to the change? With startling frequency, it turns out that constitutional 
reforms are provoked by the wrong reasons; that is, reasons that are not neutral. The process in 
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1994 was no different. The Constitution was reformed in order to allow then-President Carlos 
Menem to run for reelection. As the government did not enjoy the super majority needed to 
reform the Constitution, it threatened to employ desperate measures; one of which was to 
proceed with the changes in violation of the relevant requirements. Supposedly in order to avoid 
this last possibility, the opposition Radical Party stopped blocking the process, offering their 
votes after receiving concessions from the government meant to lighten the weight of the 
executive branch in the political system. Because of distrust that the agreement would not be 
honored, the bill that called for the reforms introduced a fixed set of items that the convention 
could only approve or reject as a whole, but never modify.35 At the same time, in a series of 
clauses, the bill allowed the convention to introduce further changes, of which one was to create 
“instruments for the integration and hierarchy of international treaties.” The debate among 
constituents does not provide many clues as to the motives that led to the incorporation of the 
treaties, or what criterion guided the selection of those that would be given hierarchical 
supremacy. The principal finality, most likely, was making a symbolical break with Argentina’s 
violent, authoritarian past.36 Effort was also made to integrate the country into the international 
legal community – regionally and globally – of human rights.37 There is not much evidence in 
the public debates to suggest the degree to which those at the convention anticipated any of the 
concrete implications of incorporating treaties; in particular, the implication of incorporating 
more generous guarantees against state punitive power. The greater part of the brief debate over 
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the issue of giving treaties hierarchical supremacy was spent in discussion over abortion, the 
right of rebuttal for anyone who is attacked in the media, and (what comes closest to our topic) 
the prohibition of the death penalty. 
 There are two more or less references to signal in the debate. One is the comment 
attributed to J. P. Cafiero, who stated that the incorporated rights included, “appeals before … 
Criminal Courts; personal freedom, personal integrity, the permanent prohibition of the death 
penalty, the condition of penitentiaries, and liability for judicial error.”38 The other is an 
admonition from A. Albamonte, pointing to a contradiction between the American Convention, 
which “establishes the right to have convictions or sentences reviewed by a higher court, while 
the current Procedural Code only establishes the right to the first instance.” Albamonte, an ally 
of the Menem government, promised his support only on condition that, “the current guarantees 
recorded in the Declarations of Rights and Guarantees that make up the first part of this 
Constitution be clearly safeguarded.”39 Which is to say, as long as the most restrictive 
interpretation of the old Constitution predominated. There is not much else. 
 The 1994 reforms, then, reinforced constitutional protections, making the text the most 
robust it had ever been since the country’s foundation.40 And it did so without open citizen 
participation in the decision, in the basic sense of being previously informed of the reforms to be 
approved and what implications (at least broad ones) could arise from approving them, if in fact 
anything could be anticipated. The specific proposal was not clear at the moment when 
representatives to the reform convention were chosen on April 10, 1994, and it is likely that it 
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remained unclear later on as well. The main question is what kind and how large a problem this 
is. 
3. Democracy and Guarantees: What is at Stake 
 A crime wave awakens fear in a segment of the population. The media feed off the 
situation (the subject sells); the fear and the feedback combine to generate more fear. Part of the 
political class is swayed. Part is not, but cedes anyways because doing so has a political payoff 
and because they do not want to expose themselves to reprisals for not going along. 
 The case offers an opportunity to examine themes relevant to democratic and 
constitutional theory. The occasion is opportune because it illustrates a relatively common case 
in our societies. The previous summary does not describe the laboratory experiment, which 
rarely occurs in reality, in which a majority (in the strong sense of the term: a majority of the 
population and its correlating representation in Congress) persecutes a minority, grotesquely 
violating its rights. Despite the enormous dramatic quality of this scenario, cases of this type are 
not particularly interesting at a theoretical level. If the violations are too serious, generalized, or 
structural, the question is not so much what should be done (whatever can be done to minimize 
the violations as soon as possible; the remaining difficulties are significant but regard the 
implementation of remedies, not answering the central question) nor is the question who should 
undertake the task (whichever institution can). The question in these cases is why action to end 
the violations has not already been undertaken, even though in such cases, it is probably 
unrealistic to expect much of institutions taken as a whole. 
 The situation that interests me is more nuanced and by that I mean more relevant. It is 




corresponding majority in Congress, mobilizes in pursuit of measures whose constitutional 
validity is dubious. Even the movement’s success is no guarantee that the laws will not be 
revoked by the same legislature once the storm is past (although, as I said, this still has not 
occurred in Argentina). Nor does the movement’s success mean the result could not have been 
worse.  In spite of the questionable method by which the laws mentioned were approved, none of 
the changes went very deep. The movement did not, at least openly, ask for extreme but 
recurrent measures such as the death penalty (something unlikely to be achieved because of the 
constitutional ban on it) but instead only sought harsher sentences and added restrictions on 
prison release (something likely prohibited but subject to some interpretation). Theoretically, an 
alternative reading of the ‘Blumberg phenomenon’ is possible: one that portrays the legislators as 
succumbing to the pressure for greater criminal prosecution, but also containing and dulling the 
passion of the demands. 
 Cases such as this one (that lack gross abuses, incessantly persecuted minorities, or 
institutions so deficient that nothing can be expected of them) are helpful for rethinking the role 
of politics and justice in an area as potentially sensitive as criminal law and the safety of citizens. 
Without exaggerating the weaknesses of one institution or the strengths of another. The main 
question, again, is whether it is justified for the democratic systems of the region, embodied by 
the local communities and their representative institutions, to define the limits of criminal 
prosecution and the protections for citizens with prevalence over the judiciary. A central element 
in this inquiry is the risk entailed by the venture. Let us not forget that we are presupposing that 
it is important to defend these protections against the State. 
 Although one familiar way to take the bull by the horns is to deny that granting judges 




this route. The central question is not semantic: what I am interested in examining is whether a 
political community meets adequate conditions to make definitive decisions without the presence 
of judges capable of opposing it. Of course the question remains vague phrased in this way, since 
it is not clear what we mean by ‘democratic system,’ or how we identify the concrete instances in 
which this system becomes operative. This is a familiar problem for constitutional theory, and a 
very important one for the present investigation. 
 My answer to the question is going to be negative. But let us suppose for the time being 
that it was affirmative. The democratic system, then, would be perfectly well-equipped for the 
task of defining the entire content of criminal policy, including the protections extended to 
people thought to be guilty of crimes committed against the State. Of course, such positions 
should be able to give an account of the real world; in our case, of the example guiding the 
exposition of this essay. There are two possibilities, both of which are potentially problematic for 
our discussion. When examining them, we should not forget that they are partially artificial. In 
the actual systems we know, judges already perform the task of looking after constitutional 
protections – even if they do not do it with rigor – and this task might exert influence over the 
democratic organs by restricting their sphere of action. In any case, it is important to ask the 
question. 
 The first perspective, the one we called ‘democratic wager’ (after a possible 
interpretation of Waldron’s theory), starts by considering a movement such as the one led by 
Blumberg as an expression of democratic exercise. But it would add that the political organs can 
adequately guarantee rights. If they are not capable of quelling calls for a harder line on crime, 
they can at least weaken them. Previously, I left open the possible interpretation of the Congress’ 




of the guarantees). And even if the political organs were unable to impede the change at a certain 
point in time, there will always be an opportunity in the future to counteract or neutralize its 
effect. This position is clearly plausible. In spite of the defects that the political institutions of the 
region possess, they are not so great as to prevent such attempts at self-reflection and change. 
 As I will explain, what makes the position problematic is the cost implied by the 
transition between the two moments; what is at stake during the interval. These circumstances 
might lead an author such as Waldron to withdraw his wager.41 The cost is so high that it justifies 
a degree of risk-aversion that might not exist for other issues. Yet, once again, nothing in my 
position suggests that political organs will necessarily always be indifferent to criminal 
protections. I try to keep my focus based on reality, but reality can change. In fact, our 
commitment to democracy requires that we do everything in our reach to improve the operation 
of the political system. But since the harm that this can cause is high, the margin of error (or our 
threshold of tolerance) must be minimized, and our attempts to elevate the quality of democratic 
discussion will have to (at least for the time being) coexist alongside the work done by judges. 
Still, my focus is dynamic: when the political system shows a sustained rise in its respect for 
criminal guarantees, the judiciary will have less room to operate, even when this respect comes 
about as consequence of the very activity of the judges (by giving shape to the public debate, 
conditioning options, and analyzing the justification for guarantees). Both sides of the discussion 
must meet the challenge. True, the right-protective side of the democrat will have to demonstrate 
that the defense of judges furthers improvement in the operation of the political organs, or at the 
very least does not impede it. But the democratic side of the person insisting on protections will 
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have to prove that the risks mentioned should not alert us to the need for an external umpire, 
especially if it is not obvious that it would obstruct improvement of the political system. 
 The second approach, that of ‘genuine democracy’ (a type of approach inspired by 
Gargarella’s proposals), is more complex and problematic, and for this reason I will address it in 
greater length. It implies denying that phenomena like the one headed by Blumberg are the 
authentic expression of democratic exercise. These kinds of campaigns, a defender of the 
position might suggest, are mere populism. They are equivalent to extending a microphone to 
someone who has just been the victim of a crime; enabling a flood of retributionist instinct to 
flow freely. True democracy lies elsewhere. The question, then, is where? In the political 
institutions themselves? Not if that means the ones we actually have. The phenomenon criticized 
is precisely a product of the way they function. And it is a product that is ‘natural’ enough. It is 
something that reoccurs on a regular basis, in Argentina as well as in other countries in the 
region. A popular demonstration was not even necessary for Ruckauf, the ex-governor of Buenos 
Aires, to suggest that criminals “be shot.” 
 But what about the institutions that we could have? Without doubt, a more deliberative 
political system or one that placed greater filters on the majoritarian will could display respect 
for protections against state punitive power. Leaving to one side the possible objections to 
ascribing to such a view (for example, regarding the loss of the majoritarian potential of the 
political system), this strategy must confront two problems. One is that it alienates us 
discursively. It deprives us of the possibility to refer to systems that we know, those in which we 
spend our lives together day-by-day, as democratic. The problem is not so much that our 




conception loses practical operability. We need a vocabulary in order to deal with the 
democracies that we currently have, however imperfect they are. 
 The second problem follows from the first. As I suggested in the analysis of the first 
approach, our demands on the political system might be more moderate, by requiring not so 
much more that what we have today (a little more discussion, involving arguments of slightly 
higher quality). Thus, a defender of this view could say that ‘genuine democracy’ is within our 
reach. But without an evident operative concept – or some way to be sure of when reality fits this 
concept – the temptation to only qualify solutions that appear acceptable to us as ‘democratic’ 
will always be latent. This could lead to counter-intuitive results. For example, insisting that the 
‘Blumberg phenomenon’ was not democratic although a future decision to neutralize the effect 
of its achievements would be. We can agree that the best decisions tend to be produced by more 
discursive processes. But bad decisions will continue to exist independently of the quality of the 
discussion, if indeed there is an external criterion for evaluating the correctness of a decision 
(beyond that of the procedure itself). And the argument over the lack of discussion surrounding 
the ‘Blumberg laws’ can just as easily be applied to whatever replaces them. 
 While I write this article, several sectors of civil society are trying to introduce into the 
public forum a set of proposals regarding personal safety and criminal policy.42 They are trying 
to call attention to structural drivers and causes of (a good amount of) crime, and push for a 
balance between protecting safety and respecting rights. My instinctive reaction is automatic: I 
am inclined to esteem that a discussion such as this one would be genuinely democratic. But I 
must check my instinct, since my conclusion could be influenced in obvious ways: by prior 
                                                            





sympathy for these proposals or for their source. The very fact that they meet with more or less 
widespread approval cannot provide much indication: the ‘Blumberg laws’ had also met with a 
similar reception. Whether the substance of the proposals is acceptable or correct should not 
have any bearing on their democratic credentials. 
 The dilemma facing this strategy is becoming clear. Either we recognize that even a 
system that better filters public opinion or is more committed to deliberative mechanisms might 
make mistaken decisions (and that – given what is at stake – this may be unacceptable), or we 
adopt a circular definition of democracy, according to which only that which we like following 
our preconceived positions is considered democratic. As democrats, we may place our faith in 
political institutions to achieve positive results. What we cannot do is only accept as democratic 
those positive results. Either we make a commitment to the process, or to the product of the 
process. If the cost of making incorrect solutions is high, we must look for institutional 
arrangements that minimize the risk. 
 There is an additional point. The account just given of the possibility that political organs 
manage to achieve correct results as regards criminal policy – something I can agree with – 
seems to presuppose the existence of a Constitution that provides a relatively clear framework 
for what is permitted. As I mentioned, in Argentina it is evident that the death penalty is not, and 
so the attempts to implement it tend to resemble murmurs that have little effect in the daily 
operations of these organs. It is perhaps for this reason that earlier I maintained that the 
‘Blumberg phenomenon’ did not openly call for it, even when some of the movement’s members 
– and in a prominent way its leader – voiced support for it. If these reclamations are nothing 
more than an epiphenomenon, it is in part because of the gravitational effect exerted by the text 




sight of the degree to which it respects the constitutional framework. And when a proposal is 
clearly outside it, we strip it of importance (to the degree that it is politically unviable).  
 Partisans of the ‘genuine democracy’ approach (as it is laid out in this essay) could 
condition their position on the existence of a Constitution charged with denoting limits and 
organizing debate. Without these limits, they could argue, political organs would be less 
respectful. The approach, of course, should justify why these limits would actually be legitimate, 
but not those imposed by the judges interpreting them. But to push further, it could be that this 
scenario is artificially skewed in favor of the ‘genuine democracy’ approach. If we truly confide 
in the power of political institutions to take decisions on criminal matters, perhaps we should, be 
it as an analytic tool, stir ourselves to take another step. We should consider the possibility of 
dispensing with the constitutional framework altogether. Then the constitutional gravity or 
inertia would cease to operate. Without reference to the framework (a reference which is among 
other things episystemic), political institutions would have complete freedom. This liberty could 
be used for different purposes. At the outset, this could be interpreted positively. But if in general 
we trust that the guarantees we have are indispensable (even when there is disagreement over 
their exact content), why risk losing this achievement by betting on greater freedom? Of course it 
is possible that the political system will lead us there anyhow. But there are shorter paths 
involving far lesser risks. 
 The ‘genuine democracy’ perspective has one last variant, and it is the least acceptable of 
all. Of course – someone might say – there could be results that arise from the political system as 
it goes about its daily business that we esteem dangerous or mistaken. But it is a mistake to stake 
so much on it. Democracy is grounded in the Constitution. Not in the whims of a fleeting 




aspirations that find expression in the calm, collected voice of the people we call the 
Constitution. 
 Employing this argument with its Hamiltonian tone in order to justify keeping criminal 
policy exclusively in the hands of democratic institutions – not in those of judges – will not get 
us very far. In the first place, fully accepting it implies that someone must watch over the 
political institutions to make sure they honor their commitments in the course of their daily 
activities (and this someone, if in fact we believe that the political institutions in place could 
actually dishonor these commitments, must be exogenous to them). But the argument does not 
work in Argentina, either, as an illustration of the promises of democratic policy on the subject. 
As we saw, the strategy adopted for the constitutional reforms in 1994 was completely 
transformative (giving hierarchical supremacy to international treaties) without forasmuch 
openly informing the public of what was going on. If we criticize the work of judges as elitist, 
why not the work that is carried out by a few representatives largely outside the public’s sight? If 
we qualify this strategy as democratic only because the representatives at the convention had 
been elected by popular vote, why not qualify the ‘Blumberg laws’ as democratic? After all, as 
condemnable as they may be, these laws were preceded by a significant social mobilization, 
while no such mobilization preceded the constitutional reforms. 
 Symbolically, the reforms were very important. In the end they came of consensus 
between opposing political forces and managed to transcend their immediate goal of extending in 
time the mandate of a government. All in all, our approval represents to a good degree a 
retrospective judgment made in the light of the modestly positive effects that the reforms have 
had. And these efforts are due to the achievements of the reforms that we consider most valuable, 




a great democratic achievement without looking at it in terms of its basic components (some 
elections and a series of discussions) can only have rhetorical meaning. 
 In sum, my answer to the question as to whether it is better for democratic institutions to 
define criminal policies without having to answer to judges is negative, or suggests formulating 
another question about the character of these institutions. Although one might think that my 
position implies renouncing the promises of democracy and abandoning hope that change can be 
brought by this path, just the opposite is the case. Paradoxically, holding that the democratic 
system (if by the term we mean the institutions of political representation) will not always be 
able to protect these values forces us to safeguard the use of the concept of democracy. It means 
affirming that our systems, despite their innumerable problems, remain democratic. It means 
recognizing that a more robust democracy will be able to minimize, although not eliminate, the 
risks of infringements to these values. It is better to recognize the deficiencies in our political 
institutions than to determine our definition of democracy in response to the concrete problems 
we confront. To recognize that the Constitution is not completely majoritarian, and that neither is 
the judiciary. And that despite all this, it is better – on whole, for now – to allow the latter to 
intervene and have an important say in defining the outline of constitutional protections. 
 The fact that political organs may at times yield to demands for harsher punishments – or 
react indolently to violations of criminal guarantees – does not mean that judges will always 
resist or that they see themselves as the protectors of these guarantees. This does not alter the gist 
of my argument. The political organs and judges effectively belong to the same institutional 
system, and the differences between them cannot be radical. Frequently, judges are part of the 
problem. But when they are less protective than the legislative branch, the legislators can counter 




rights against the State are those of the people subjected to its punitive apparatus (the rights of 
victims of common crimes, despite their weight, do not outweigh them). Consequently, the 
judiciary would not be able to maintain that the legislature, by being more generous in terms of 
the protections, limits other rights that are equally strong. Let us imagine a situation in which 
judges obstinately maintain a more restrictive position than the political organs, even when the 
latter emphatically insist on amplifying the protections. This is not the case in Argentina. 
Although the judges have not provided monolithic protection of the guarantees, the response by 
the political powers has been even more deficient (and as I will explain, their lack of response is 
part of the problem). In any case, however, in the imaginary situation the political branches could 
do an incredible amount to improve the protection of individuals without relying on judges: from 
increasing the budget for public defenders, to reforming police departments, prisons, and 
procedures with the aim of raising the quality of the poor standards in place. Much of the 
substance of criminal protections concern actions that do not directly involve judges, but rather 
the intervention of agencies whose budget and management they do not control. 
 Why is it so important to privilege these protections even at the expense of side stepping 
political bodies with more direct democratic credentials? There are multiple reasons, the majority 
of which are obvious. Most of us live in countries with authoritarian pasts, and this is projected 
into the present: abuses by police and penitentiary officials are not exceptional, and nor are 
procedural frame-ups of innocent people. Mistreatment not only stems from repressive action by 
the State and its agencies, but also from its inaction. It is indolence, for example, in response to 
prison overpopulation and overcrowding that is at fault in cases where minimum standards – not 




 Those who end up in the state punitive network are mostly those who are worst off 
socioeconomically. Their weakness on the economic level translates into (while also resulting 
from) weakness on the political level. Inmates who have been convicted are not allowed to vote. 
Until very recently, even the detainees awaiting trial did not vote; if they do now it is only 
because of judicial intervention.43 They cannot voice their complaints in the political arena: their 
participatory rights are reduced and their position unpopular. Although the unpopularity of a 
measure cannot in general serve as a valid parameter for defending it from outside the political 
sphere (to give it more weight than it would merit in the political arena), things are different 
when the fundamental values such as those described are involved. 
 People who enter the criminal justice system face high risks of becoming trapped in it. 
Not only because their conditions make them more prone to repeated criminal activity, but also 
because the agencies of criminal prosecution – having previously registered them into the system 
– can keep them on their radar more easily. While cost-benefit analysis is implausible when 
fundamental rights are at stake, nor is it demonstrable that the restriction of rights and guarantees 
and reinforcing punitive response actually improve public safety. It is not uncommon for the 
principal criminal networks to enjoy police protection and so elude prosecution, and there are 
also offenses for which preventive measures are simply ineffective. What these policies do surely 
achieve is filling prisons, generally with people from the subordinate strata of society. 
Imprisonment only worsens their precarious conditions. As the legal process, moreover, can take 
years, whether innocent or guilty, detainees are forced to await their verdict isolated from society 
and exposed to all types of abuse. This process in itself condemns them. 
                                                            




 Yet, is it not strange that we fear giving political organs the last word on these issues 
when we delegate decisions of enormous consequence on our lives, such as those concerning 
essential aspects of political economy? There are several ways to respond to this question, but I 
will focus on one. While we resist the idea that custodial interests over rights can be entirely 
negotiated (sacrificed to obtain certain goals), the political terrain is by definition the sum of all 
interests. The distinction between the character of rights or principles and that of political 
decisions is not a sharp one.44 But we tend to require the State, when taking economic decisions, 
to promote the interests of the greatest number. Yet we deny that this is its duty when criminal 
guarantees are at stake. Preventing such aggregate considerations from potentially determining 
whether or not an individual is subjected to criminal law deservedly constitutes a historic 
achievement. 
 It is true that the State might violate rights as a result of (bad) policy. It could, for 
example, blatantly ignore property rights. As this right possesses a component that is more 
instrumental than intrinsic, not every restriction of property is invalid, which does not imply that 
any restriction is valid. Furthermore, an economic policy could seriously abridge social rights, 
thus aggravating the burden of groups that are already vulnerable. But these are also cases where 
we tend to invoke the protection of non-political groups. 
 At the same time, we should not lose sight of the type of harm that debilitating criminal 
protections can cause. Punitive presumptuousness on the part of the State does not only threaten 
personal freedoms. It also involves the dignity, integrity, equality, and inviolability of human 
beings, especially in the contexts already described where state agencies are so deficient. We 
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usually assign greater importance to these values than to economic interests or property rights. 
When the State infringes on them, it causes harm that is by definition direct: a right is sacrificed 
in order to promote common or less notable interests. The harm is not only material. It also has 
strong symbolical content. It reveals the readiness of the State to turn its back on the basic 
standards for treatment of people living in it. Those who directly benefit from the maintenance of 
these standards may be guilty of having violated rights or goods of inestimable importance, but 
this does not mean they are less deserving of the protections. To the contrary: these people 
become especially vulnerable from the moment they are subjected to the punitive arm of the 
political community. 
 People who generally suffer keen socioeconomic deprivation might experience contempt 
that is similar. As I said, several of these hardships could constitute violations of social rights and 
therefore be remediable in courts. We know that in the domain of social rights arguments – 
although not necessarily conclusive or correct – are often laid out to demand that the decision not 
completely remove itself from political considerations (progressivity, budgetary scarcity, the 
necessity of a systemic perspective when designing public policy, etc.). Some of the deficiencies 
in criminal matters have a structural component as well, and include violations of social rights. 
This typically occurs in the situation of prisons and the rights of those deprived of their freedom. 
In such circumstances, the judiciary could indicate a path for the political branches to take 
without completely defining the range of options open to the representative organs. In many 
other cases, however, the value at stake is of a less graduated nature (the domicile is or is not 
inviolable; a judge can or cannot condemn the accused if the prosecutor did not press charges; 
police can or cannot extract a confession, et cetera), and these arguments cannot then be 




 Both protection against crime and recognition of victims’ suffering are significant 
obligations for a political community. As important as they are, however, they cannot be honored 
at the expense of violating the basic rights of others, especially when those others are already in a 
vulnerable position and the repressive apparatus contains serious flaws such as the ones 
mentioned. The democratic argument cannot demand indulgence from us in these circumstances. 
It does not go that far. 
4. Conclusion 
 In this essay, I tried to argue that the political process cannot have the last word in 
defining criminal protections. Not because they cannot be safeguarded through political action in 
certain instances, but rather because the failure to do so is too frequent, and because the 
transition cost between one moment and another (between the time a hard line policy is 
implemented and the moment it is rescinded) is very high, at least right now. We must search 
elsewhere for protection, and judges are well placed to provide it. Naturally, judges might also 
mistakenly offer overly restrictive interpretations, but in such cases, the congress that does not 
agree would be able to amplify the interpretation without major difficulty, thus leaving judges 
with even fewer grounds for resistance. Even when judges remained obstinate (due to their 
ideology or yielding to pressure from portions of the population), the political branches would 
still have the capacity to significantly improve the protections. When we cannot have everything 
we want, we must make choices. Democracy is very important to us, but so are rights. And if we 
lack the guarantee that the political organs will be respectful of rights, then we must be respectful 
of the guarantees. 
